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INCOME TAX "LOOPHOLES" AND
POLITICAL RHETORIC
Boris I. Bittker*

I.

lNTRODUGrION

the 1972 presidential campaign, federal income tax reform came unexpectedly to the foreground as a political issue
in the Democratic primaries and promised for a few weeks to play an
important role in the election itself. It was soon elbowed aside by the
prospect of peace in Viet Nam, charges of political espionage and
corruption, and attacks on the personal attributes of the two candidates, but for a short time it actually succeeded in crowding school
bussing off the front pages. To the cynic, this might in retrospect
seem to be the principal accomplishment, if not the purpose, of the
vivid charges that the Internal Revenue Code is riddled with loopholes and that millionaires sometimes pay less in taxes than bluecollar workers. I am inclined, rather, to believe that these grievances
continued to smoulder below the surface, like the issue of school
bussing, even after President Nixon and Senator McGovern turned
their attention to other questions.
Moreover, just as hostility to school bussing emanated from a
variety of sources, so the assault on tax loopholes brought together
some strange bedfellows. Advocates of a "New Populism" wanted to
close loopholes in order to strengthen the income tax as a tool of income redistribution. Academic experts, who supplied most of the
intellectual ammunition for the tax reform movement, wanted to
purge the income tax of its imperfections primarily to insure "horizontal equity"; for most of them, increased progressivity was only a
secondary objective, and some were prepared to accept, or even to
advocate, a less progressive rate structure if that was the legislative
cost of tax reform. Welfare reformers who wanted to replace today's
welfare system with a guaranteed-income program thought that their
proposals could be financed by closing tax loopholes. For still others,
ta.x loopholes were only symptoms of a worse disease-a federal
bureaucracy serving the interests of the very rich and the very poor
but financed by those in between. Their remedy was to cut back
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federal expenditures, rather than to close the loopholes in order to
support or increase the offensive programs.
"Tax reform" could serve as the rallying cry of forces that had
little else in common because it is irretrievably ambiguous. In academic circles, to be sure, "income tax reform" almost invariably refers to proposals to expand the tax's coverage, but the term can also
be used as a label for proposals to narrow its scope or scuttle it entirely. The same ambiguity surrounds the term "social change,"
which candidates for admission to law school like to offer as the motive that animates their interest in practicing law-with no apparent
acknowledgement that Vice-President Agnew may be as dedicated to
social change as they, but in a different direction.
A similar source of ambiguity is the catchy charge that the federal
income tax is so full of loopholes that it constitutes a vast "welfare
program for the rich. " 1 Though intended as a call for heavier ta.xes
on capital gains, state and municipal bond interest, and the oil industry, this allegation panders to a popular distaste for the "welfare
mess," whether its beneficiaries are rich or poor. The same rhetorical
device was employed by President Nixon, but with a better feel for
public reaction, when he alleged that Senator McGovern's tax reform proposals would add 82 million people "to the welfare rolls.'' 2
The instrument that was to accomplish this result was the Senator's
famous $1,000 tax credit or "demogrant," a technical device that he
was unable to explain in the headlines, but that, unfortunately, he
could not erase from them either. The very label "demogrant" invited comparison with a welfare grant, and President Nixon can
hardly be blamed for seizing on the parallelism at a time when tax
scholars have been asserting that tax allowances, including the basic
personal and dependency exemptions, are the equivalent of subsidies
or grants of public funds to the taxpayer. 3
Another example of the coalescence of rhetoric can be seen in the
allegation by the authors of A Populist Manifesto that the federal
income tax authorizes "legal larceny," 4 a phrase that is virtually idenI. Stern, Uncle Sam's Welfare Program-for the Rich, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1972,
See also P. STERN, THE RAPr: OF THE TAXPAYER (1973).
2. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1972, at 47, cols. 2-3.
3. See Heller, Some Observations on the Role and Reform of the Federal Income
Tax, in 1 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESs., TAX REvlSION
COMPENDIUM 181, 190 (Comm. Print 1959); Pfaff &: Pfaff, How Equitable Are Implicit
Public Grants?, in REDISTRIBUTION To THE RICH AND THE PooR 181 (K. Boulding &: M.
Pfaff ed. 1972); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705
(1970). See also Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget,
22 NATL. TAX J. 244 (1969) and articles cited in id. at 244-45 nn.1-4.
4. J. NEWFIELD &: J. GREENFIELD, A POPULIST MANIFESTO 97 (Warner Paperback
Library ed. 1972).
§ 6 (Magazine), at 28, col. 2.
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tical with John Chamberlin's charge, from the right wing, that the
Sixteenth Amendment "legalizes a theft." 5 The targets of the latterday populists are the loopholes for the rich, of course, but they do not
have a copyright on this complaint. A tract calling for repeal of the
Sixteenth Amendment (appealingly entitled The Income Tax: Root
of All Evil), for example, also alleges that "pressure groups" are responsible for "loopholes," 6 that the rich get around the law with the
aid of "expert accountants," 7 that we now "soak the poor" more than
the rich,8 and that salvation lies with a coalition of workers, housewives, professional people, and small businessmen, since "the big industrialists, bankers, and commercial interests . . . have no reason to
favor repeal [of the Sixteenth Amendment]." 9 It has even been suggested, in language echoing the argument in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Company10 (which held the 1894 federal income tax
unconstitutional and was in turn overruled by the Sixteenth Amendment), that today's income tax is "unconstitutionally discriminatory," and that a "taxpayers' liberation movement" should appeal to
the courts, since both Congress and the Treasury have turned a deaf
ear to taxpayers' grievances.11
Barraged by assertions that the rich have conspired to tax the income of the poor while exempting themselves, the working man may
conclude that he would prefer a sales tax-a preference that has already been exhibited by rank-and-file voters in the few states that
still lack a state income tax. In a 1972 public opinion survey commissioned by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
for example, almost twice (46 per cent versus 25 per cent) as many respondents preferred a state sales tax to a state income tax as a source
of substantial additional revenue; when asked to name the nation's
"fairest" tax, they named the state sales tax about as often as the federal income tax (33 per cent versus 36 per cent), while the state income
tax was chosen by only 11 per cent of the respondents.12 At the federal level, this attitude may well lead to enactment of a federal valueadded tax, which would be a national sales tax in disguise-a consummation that the new populists would surely deplore.
5. Chamberlin, Book Review, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 502, 505 (1954).
6. F. CHODOROV, THE INCOME TAX: ROOT OF ALL EVIL 66-67 (1954).
7. Id. at 67.
8. Id. at 51-52.
9. Id. at 108.
IO. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
II. Halby, Is the Income Tax Unconstitutionally Discriminatory?, 58 A.B.A.J. 1291,
1292 (1972).
12. U.S . .ADVISORY CO~IMN. ON INTERGOVERN~!ENTAL RELATIONS, PUBLIC OPINION AND
TAXES 7-10 (1972).
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I do not wish by these observations to suggest that critics of the
Internal Revenue Code should suppress their reformist instincts lest
they get bitten by dogs that are now sleeping peacefully. Nor would
I deny the usefulness of political slogans. As Niebuhr has said, "Contending factions in a social struggle require morale; and morale is
created by the right dogmas, symbols and emotionally potent oversimplifications."13 The prudent strategist, however, will avoid slogans and rhetoric that can be captured by the enemy and used in a
successful counterattack. But this is not a manual on political strategy. My purpose, rather, is to examine the "loopholes" that dominate
the discussion of federal income tax reform.
When used by newspaper reporters and politicians, the term "ta.x
loophole" is always a pejorative, though the tone of disapproval may
be mingled with a dash of admiration for the astute lawyer or accountant who discovered the device. Since condemnation is the predominant tone, it is always assumed that loopholes can be quickly
and reliably distinguished from tax provisions that are reasonable
and fair. Sometimes, to be sure, it is suggested that the only criterion
is self-interest: one man's loophole is another man's relief provision.
More frequently, loopholes are said to inure primarily, if not solely,
to the benefit of the rich, either because high-priced experts must be
employed to devise loophole-exploiting transactions or because it
takes capital to consummate the plan after a tax-free route has been
discovered. Finally, it is often thought that tax loopholes entail an
enormous loss of potential governmental revenue, and that their
eradication would either permit everyone else's taxes to be reduced
or provide the funds for social welfare programs of great magnitude.
Each of these issues deserves scrutiny.

II.

STATUTORY AMBIGUITIES AND OMISSIONS

The term "tax loophole" is often used to denote a flaw in the
language of the Internal Revenue Code or in the Treasury Regulations, discovered by a sharp-eyed lawyer or accountant and exploited
by his clients. In popular mythology, indeed, the major activity of
tax experts is the search for divergencies between the letter of the
law and its spirit, somewhat as W. C. Fields described his purpose in
reading the Bible: "Looking for loopholes, of course, looking for
loopholes." This usage accords with the Oxford English Dictionary's
definition of "loophole" as "an ambiguity or omission in a statute,
etc., which affords opportunity for evading its intention."14 Result13. R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY XV (1948).
14. 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 433 (1933). There is, of course, a vast body
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ing by hypothesis from a legislative error, a loophole in this sense is
likely to be corrected by Congress once it comes to public attention;
the phrase "notorious loophole" is thus either a contradiction in
terms or a transitory phenomenon. When discovered by a tax expert,
therefore, a loophole is a wasting asset that he must exploit quickly
but warily. His clientele must be informed of his discovery if he is to
reap a financial benefit from it, but when he exposes it to view, he
reduces its life expectancy by stimulating Congress to enact corrective legislation. His dilemma resembles that of the archeologist
whose excavation brings an ancient fresco to light but simultaneously exposes it to the destructive forces of nature.
For its part, the Treasury must also make a difficult decision
when it discovers a loophole. A request for corrective legislation will
call attention to the statutory imperfection and stimulate taxpayers
to exploit it in the interim, but if the Treasury seeks to discourage
such attempts by announcing that the ambiguity or omission is more
apparent than real and hence should not be relied on by taxpayers,
Congress may refuse to take action on the ground that the need for
legislation has not yet been demonstrated. A leading tax publication,
for example, once announced that "for months ... the tax fraternity
has been aware that the Treasury had a list of loopholes in the law
that it considered too hot to release, for fear of encouraging taxpayers to flock to use these tax-saving devices." 115
Loopholes of this type-statutory ambiguities and omissions so
clearly in conflict with the intent of the legislature16 that prompt
correction can be expected as soon as they come to light-are, in my
opinion, not very common. One example (chosen because it is not
excessively technical) is a 1954 provision17 that permitted the taxpayer to take a dependency deduction for a member of his household
whose principal place of abode was the taxpayer's home, even if the
dependent was not related to the taxpayer by blood, marriage, or
adoption-relationships that had previously been indispensible to a
dependency exemption. Intended by Congress to permit foster chilof case law and commentary on legislative "intent," "purpose," and "motive," and the
view that these are fictional concepts is less prevalent than it was two decades ago.
See J. CoHEN, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LEGISLATION 35-186 (2d ed. 1967); A. LENHOFF,
COMMENTS, CAsF.S AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 577-85, 787-854 (1949).
15. 28 of Treasury's Famous Secret Loopholes and Hardships Revealed by Ways 0'
Means Committee, 5 J. TAXATION 322 (1956). See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS. &: STAFF OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Ltsr OF SUBsrANTIVE UNINTENDED BENEFITS AND HARDSHIPS AND ADDmoNAL PROBLEMS
FOR THE TECHNICAL .AMENDMENTS Acr BILL OF 1957 (1956); Technical Amendments Act
of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606.
16. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(a)(9).

1104

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1099

dren to qualify as dependents, the language of the new provision
held out the tantalizing possibility that the taxpayer could deduct
$600 a year for the cost of supporting a mistress or kept man. Before
this incentive to what would now be called an alternative life style
got very far, however, the courts shot it down. Invoking "the well
settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible construction, so as
to effectuate the legislative intention and, if possible, avoid an absurd conclusion," the Tax Court held:
In our opinion Congress never intended the specific paragraph in
question to be construed so literally as to permit a dependency
exemption for an individual whom the taxpayer is maintaining in
an illicit relationship in conscious violation of the criminal law of
the jurisdiction of his abode.
We are of the opinion that to so construe the statute would in
effect ascribe to the Congress an intent to countenance, if not to aid
and encourage, a condition not only universally regarded as against
good public morals, but also constituting a continuing, willful, open,
and deliberate violation of the laws of the State of Alabama. . . .
This we are unable to do.18

The Tax Court's surmise about the legislative intent was subsequently confirmed by Congress, which amended the Code in 1958
to provide explicitly in section 152(b)(5) that a person whose relationship to the taxpayer violates local law is not to be treated as "a
member of the taxpayer's household." Recommending enactment of
this language, the Senate Finance Committee described it as declaratory of the law ("[I]t is made clear that .... ") 19 rather than as a substantive change, and provided that it would be retroactively effective
as of 1954, when the ambiguous provision creating the problem entered the Code.20 Along with this clarification of the law, Congress
closed another loophole in section 152(a)(9) by amending it to provide that the taxpayer may not claim his spouse as a dependent, since
such a deduction (although arguably sanctioned by the original language of this provision21) would ordinarily duplicate a deduction for
the taxpayer's spouse that was already authorized by another provision of the Code (section 151). Here again, Congress denied that it
was making a substantive change, asserting instead that the legislation was intended only "[t]o make it clear that [the loophole] was
18. Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 758, 760-61 (1957).
19. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1958).
20. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, § 152(a)(9), 68A Stat. 43 (codified at INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 152(a)(9)).
21. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, § 152(a)(9), 68A Stat. 43.
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not at any time intended" and reinforcing this explanation by providing that the new language was to be applied retroactively.22
For another example of a loophole arising from inept draftsmanship, I turn to the Connecticut tax on capital gains, which, after exempting $2,000 of such gains in specified circumstances, goes on to
provide that the $2,000 exemption is to be multiplied by a fraction,
the numerator and denominator of which are then described in
terms not here relevant. 23 The legislative purpose was to reduce the
$2,000 exemption to a lesser amount or even to zero in certain circumstances. But the draftsman forgot, or perhaps never knew, that a
fraction can be greater than 1/1, as well as smaller. By failing to provide that the exemption might in no case exceed $2,000, he opened
the door to an exemption of many times that amount-indeed, to an
exemption of unlimited amount-when the statutory fraction exceeds I/ I. Another case of inadvertance-also drawn from the Connecticut statute books-is the inadvertent omission of the word
"not" from a provision defining the term "resident" for tax purposes.24
In cases like these, the courts often come to the rescue by holding
that the letter of the law is not controlling, and that the legislative
purpose-gleaned from the statute's history or context, or inferred
by comparing the practical consequences of the competing interpretations-must prevail over the scrivener's deficiency. A 1940 opinion
of the United States Supreme Court describes this process succinctly:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose
of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to
give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and
of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such
cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has
led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond
the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when
the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an
unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legisla22, S. REP. No. 1983, supra note 19, at 15. This action in effect endorsed a prior
judicial decision refusing to permit a deduction for the spouse under section 152(a)(9),
despite its language, because the over-all statutory scheme when illuminated by its
legislative history showed "that it was not the intention of the Congress to grant an
additional exemption" for a dependent spouse. Dewsbury v. United States, 146 F. Supp.
467, 469 (Ct. Cl. 1956). See also REv. Rul. 55-325, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 18.
23. CONN. GEN, STAT• .ANN.

§

12-506(c)(l) (1972).

24. No. 5, § l(b)(l), [1971] Conn. Pub. Acts June Spec. Sess. 2173, from which
the bracketed word was omitted: "or who is [not] domiciled in this state but •••" The
error became a matter of only academic interest when the entire act was repealed,
later in the same session, by No. 8, § I, [1971] Conn. Pub. Acts June Spec. Sess. 2245.
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tion as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose, rather than
the literal words. 25
This approach is well illustrated by the Tax Court's comments in
the dependency exemption case, summarized above, to which numerous other examples could be added.
The courts are not always this candid in admitting that the words
are being twisted a little to get at the substance lying below the surface. In Helvering v. Owens,26 for example, the Supreme Court had
to pass on the amount to be deducted as a casualty loss when the taxpayer's automobile was slightly damaged in a collision. He had paid
about $1,800 for the car, but it was worth only $225 before and $190
after the accident. Although only $35 of damage was attributable to
the collision, the statutory language seemed clearly to permit the
taxpayer to deduct the difference between the car's original cost and
its value after the accident, or over $1,600 on these facts. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit so decided, in a per curiam opinion
bearing every indication of Judge Learned Hand's authorship:
"[T]he letter is too plain; we should have to disregard the words, and
should not be interpreting them, if we refused to take them just as
they read." 27 In a substantially identical case, however, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit parted company with Judge Hand,
asserting that "it is not reasonable to suppose that Congress intended
to permit [a] deduction in excess of actual loss" and that "the statute
should be construed as containing such exception[s] where necessary
to avoid a consequence which Congress clearly did not intend."28
The Supreme Court, reviewing both cases,29 endorsed the Fourth
Circuit's reading of the statute but buried the issue in a cloud of
verbiage rather than admitting that it was stretching the statutory
language. This should not, however, obscure the Court's implicit
determination to reach an eminently sensible result despite the
draftsman's ineptitude.
Since loopholes, as I have been using the term, depend for their
existence on a judicial willingness to elevate the letter of the law over
its substance, the kind of judicial activism just described promises
to turn the loophole into an extinct art form. I do not mean to assert
that the courts are never willing to enforce a badly drafted statute as
25. United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
26. 305 U.S. 468 (1939).
27. Helvering v. Owens, 95 F.2d 318, 319 (2d Cir. 1938).
28. Helvering v. Obici, 97 F.2d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 1938).
29. Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939), afjg. 97 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1938) and
revg. 95 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1938).
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written, or that it is already as difficult for a taxpayer to escape
through a loophole as it is for a camel to squeeze through the eye of
a needle. Judge Learned Hand's refusal in the Owens case to ride
roughshod over the statutory language was reversed by the Supreme
Court, but that does not mean that every statutory deficiency is
corrected. It is an old chestnut that maxims of statutory construction
come in opposing pairs, and occasionally a pair will emanate from
the same author. Thus, the same Holmes who warned his fellow
judges that "if [the legislature] has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed"30 also said, "We
[judges] do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what
the statute means." 31 For loopholes to survive, the latter attitude
must prevail.
Lacking a more systematic study of this question, I offer the
hypothesis that loopholes conforming to the Oxford English Dictionary definition quoted earlier32 ("an ambiguity or omission in a
statute, etc., which affords opportunity for evading its intention") are
comparatively rare. The quality of legislative drafting in the federal
tax field is unusually high, the Internal Revenue Code is subject to
frequent revision, and I know of no area of the law in which the
courts are more likely to search for the legislative purpose and prefer
it, whenever it can be discerned, to a literal construction of the
statutory language. Of course, ambiguities in the tax law are sometimes resolved in the taxpayer's favor when the legislative intent is
debatable, but by hypothesis these are not cases in which the legislative intent has been disregarded, however critical one may be of the
substantive outcome.
Even if I overestimate the level of judicial activism, and thus
underestimate the number of loopholes resulting from drafting ineptitudes that survive judicial scrutiny, it should be noted that
taxpayers will continue to escape through loopholes only if Congress
fails to take corrective action. If Congress fails to overrule a decision
because it is content with the law as judicially interpreted, the loophole is converted into a legislatively sanctioned tax allowance. If the
decision is allowed to stand only because Congress is too busy with
other matters, the result can be regarded as a loophole-by-inertia.
But the taxpayer who uses such an escape hatch is not so much exploiting a draftsman's error that frustrates the intent of the legisla30. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) CTustice Holmes on circuit).
31. 0. Hou.ms, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920).
32. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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ture as he is benefitting from Congressional inattention or indifference. A collector of unblemished specimens will not value a loophole-by-inertia as highly as a statutory mistake that has not yet been
described in the literature and is so clearly at odds with the Congressional intent that it will almost certainly evoke an amendment when
it comes to public attention.
I do not want to make too much of these paradoxes, or to assert
that there are no "unintended benefits" 33 in the Internal Revenue
Code. No doubt it contains some loopholes in the classic sensestatutory errors that well-advised taxpayers are exploiting without
the knowledge of Congress or the Treasury. No doubt some of these
unintended benefits will be sustained by the courts, despite the
professed judicial reluctance to allow taxpayers to make a fortress of
the dictionary. No doubt some of these judicial victories will enable
still other taxpayers to exploit the same mistakes because of congressional inertia.
When all is said and done, however, these are not the "loopholes"
under attack. The major targets of income tax reformers are such
statutory provisions as the exclusion of state and municipal bond
interest from taxable income, percentage depletion, the reduced tax
rate on long-term capital gains, and the deductions for local taxes,
mortgage interest, and charitable contributions. These allowances
have not been brought to light by the diligent burrowing of astute
and highly paid tax experts seeking to frustrate the objectives of
Congress. Sometimes, to be sure, tax scholars seek to enliven their
prose with suggestions to the contrary. Thus, a recent study of
"those hidden subsidies termed implicit public grants" 3 4' promises to
lead us through "the jungle of provisions that convey special advantages only to the legal wizard or to the individual wealthy enough to
obtain the services of a legal expert or to the person adept at manipulating potential sources of income in order to conform to some
obscure section in the tax law."35 But a conducted tour through this
vividly portrayed "jungle" will disappoint the venturesome reader.
Nothing more exotic will be encountered on his safari than an expensive but familiar flock of domesticated animals, of which the most
prominent are the joint return for married couples, the personal and
dependency exemptions, and the deductibility of charitable contributions, interest, and taxes. Far from being reserved for "legal
wizards," these provisions satisfy Gibbon's description of a late
33. See note 15 supra.
34. Pfaff &: Pfaff, supra note 3, at 181.
35. Id. at 183.
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Roman emperor's collection of manuscripts and concubines: "The
one, as the other, was intended rather for use than ostentation." If
the man in the street does not already know about these tax benefits,
he can fill this gap in his knowledge by reading the Treasury's free
publications or paying $5 to a store-front tax "consultant."

III.

TAX AVOIDANCE TACTICS

In popular usage, the term "loophole" often also reflects the
widely held view that tax experts have a magical power to reduce
tax.es, primarily for the rich, by paperwork that has no other visible
consequences. If Smith makes a series of lifetime gifts to his children
in order to save death tax.es by removing the property from his tax.able estate, for example, the transfers may seem devoid of practical
consequences because the Smiths are bound together by ties of
affection that transcend their legal rights. Yet King Lear learned that
family loyalties may dissolve, and even the layman who thinks that
the gifts just described are nothing more than tax gimmicks might
well balk if the Internal Revenue Code required him to include his
teenage children's earnings when computing his tax.able income.
While something can be said for disregarding legal rights within the
family, there is also much to be said for treating individuals as discrete units; debatable judgments are unavoidable in such an area.
The concept of "family" implies a definition that includes some of
the taxpayer's relatives and excludes others; no one would propose
taxing the "family of man" as a single unit. Conversely, however,
few are so committed to individualism as to propose that family ties
be wholly disregarded in computing the individual's tax liability.
The tax advantages that are inevitably conferred on taxpayers who
find themselves on the tax-free side of the fence, or who get there by
arranging their affairs to satisfy the law, may be called "loopholes"
by the layman. So used, however, the term simply expresses disapproval of the rules; any implication that the legislative intent is
being frustrated is unwarranted.
But the expert sometimes engages in another type of paperwork,
similarly criticized but simultaneously admired by the layman as a
species of black magic, where the implication of a conflict with the
legislative intent may be better founded. I refer to transactions that
are designed to fit within one statutory compartment rather than
another but whose practical consequences are otherwise transitory.
A taxpayer, for example, is about to sell some appreciated property
with the intention of making a gift of the proceeds to his children;
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on consulting his attorney or accountant, he is advised to give the
property itself to the children and let them make the sale, in order
to take advantage of the fact that a donor of appreciated property is
not taxed on his unrealized gain when he transfers it by gift. His hope,
therefore, is that the gain will be taxed to the children, who may be
subject to a lower tax rate. In such a case, and in many others that
could be added to the list, the anticipated tax advantage derives from
the fact that the Internal Revenue Code, despite its awesome detail,
contains many provisions of such disarming simplicity as to invite
manipulation. The~e is nothing in the Code determining whether
the transaction should be taxed as a sale of property by the taxpayer
followed by a gift of the proceeds by him to the children, or as a gift
of the property to the children followed by a sale of the property by
them. As a result, the courts must decide how the transaction is to be
treated for tax purposes.
Manoeuvres as transparent as these are rarely successful, but
when a bit more time elapses between one step in the transaction
and another, they may get by. If so, is the taxpayer exploiting a
loophole of the type discussed above, viz., a statutory ambiguity or
omission that serves to frustrate the legislative intent? There are,
undoubtedly, taxpayer successes that one can confidently say would
have been disapproved if the issue had been exposed when the legislation was before the Congress. More frequently, however, a remedy
would have been so complex that no clear legislative intent can be
reconstructed from the materials at hand.
In my gift-sale case, for example, a legislative body that wished to
establish a statutory rule might draw the line by establishing an
arbitrary time limit (e.g., 30 days) and providing that any sale within
that time by the donee should be imputed to the donor. A more restricted statutory remedy might tax the donor only if the donee is a
minor child. Or the donor might be taxed only if the donee sells the
property to a buyer with whom the donor had negotiated, only if
the terms of the sale had been prearranged, or only if the value of
the property or the tax differential between donor and donee exceeds
a specified amount. Another approach would be a statutory presumption that the donee acted under the donor's influence, with an opportunity to prove instead that the donee made an independent decision
to sell the property rather than keep it. When the choice of statutory
remedies is as wide as this, it is impossible to say with any assurance
that the disputed issue would have been resolved in one way rather
than another by the legislature.
In point of fact, the courts are quite unsympathetic to avoidance
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tactics of this type. This is not the place to describe in detail the
judicial doctrines that are regularly invoked to deflate ingenious and
initially promising schemes, but the labels-"business purpose,"
"sham or camouflage," "step transactions," "form vs. substance," and
the like-convey their flavor. 36 Suffice it to say that the courts are
quite ready in tax cases to probe beneath the surface before accepting
a transaction at face value. An acerbic comment by Chief Judge
John R. Brown of the fifth circuit court of appeals can stand as a
summary of this attitude. Refusing to allow the taxpayers in a complex transaction to hide behind a facade entailing the use of an
attorney named W. R. Deal as an intermediary, he said: "The Deal
deal was not the real deal. That ends it." 37
In point of fact, the layman is far more inclined than the expert
to trust paperwork as a shield against tax liability. One is bombarded
at cocktail parties with tax schemes that would not convince the most
inexperienced revenue agent or that teeter on the brink of fraud,
but which are offered as proof positive of the speaker's astute sophistication. Randolph Paul's comments on this subject twenty years ago
cannot be improved:
Above all things, a tax attorney must be an indefatigable skeptic;
he must discount everything he hears and reads. The market place
abounds with unsound avoidance schemes which will not stand the
test of objective analysis and litigation. The escaped tax, a favorite
topic of conversation at the best clubs and the most sumptuous
pleasure resorts, expands with repetition into fantastic legends.
But clients want opinions with happy endings, and he smiles best
who smiles last. It is wiser to state misgivings at the beginning than
to have to acknowledge them ungracefully at the end. The tax
adviser has, therefore, to spend a large part of his time advising
against schemes of this character. I sometimes think that the most
important word in his vocabulary is "No" ....as
But not all tax experts are "indefatigable skeptics," and even
those who are can sometimes be persuaded by their clients to try a
tax avoidance scheme, especially if the only penalty for failure is the
tax that would have been due and payable if the transaction had
taken its normal course. (The deficiency in case of failure must be
paid with interest, but the 6 per cent interest may be less than the
value of the money to the taxpayer in the interim, and it is in any
event deductible.) And these plans sometimes succeed.
36. See generally B. BllTKER &: J. EUS'l'ICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA·
1-19 to -20 (3d ed. 1971) and articles cited therein.
37. Blueberry Land Co. v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 93, 102 (5th Cir. 1966).
38. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 RocKY MT. L. REv. 412, 416 (1953).
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The layman, then, is right in thinking that business transactions
are frequently cast in a particular form for no reason other than tax
avoidance, that the paperwork may create a distinction without a
difference, and that these formalities often succeed. Indeed, the
paperwork may take the taxpayer through a tax-free route that was
explicitly endorsed by Congress as an alternative to another route
that is taxable. Many other tax avoidance transactions are feasible
only because Congress has failed to enact a safeguard against them.
Congressional inaction may reflect a judgment that the area is unimportant, that administrative and judicial scrutiny is preferable to a
legislative solution, or that a satisfactory legislative remedy would be
too complex; or it may stem from an unresolved difference of opinion within Congress or between Congress and the Treasury about
the best remedy to be adopted or even about whether there is a
defect to be remedied. Still other tax avoidance transactions are in
fact vulnerable, but nevertheless escape the attention of the revenue
agent if and when the return is audited. The army may have a
"smart" missile that can find an airplane despite its evasive tactics,
but the Internal Revenue Service has no mechanical device to unveil
"the real deal" (to borrow Judge Brown's phrase), and its enforcement budget is scandalously low.
There is no harm in applying the term "loophole" to tax avoidance opportunities of the type just described, provided one does not
infer from this label that they are caused by flaws in the statutory
language that will be corrected as soon as they come to the attention
of Congress. Moreover, however fertile this area may be as a breeding
ground for "loopholes" in the layman's sense, it is not a major target
of income tax reform, except to the extent that changes in the basic
tax rules (e.g., in the treatment of capital gains) may reduce the
opportunity for tax "planning" and "manipulation."
IV.

"EROSION," "PREFERENCES," AND OTHER EUPHEMISMS

Academic proponents of income tax reform have long been
aware of the confusion generated by applying the term "loophole"
to the major targets of their endeavors. To imply, even by a label,
that they are merely exposing a series of unintended tax benefits
attributable to sloppy draftsmanship belittles their crusade. It also
invites a countercharge of naivete, since the provisions in question
were enacted deliberately rather than by inadvertence, and, though
the results may differ from the legislative expectation, a congressional
failure to amend or repeal the provisions is more likely to reflect

May 1973]

Income Tax "Loopholes"

1113

legislative approval or a political stalemate than ignorance. Tax
reformers, therefore, have searched for a more accurate term than
"loophole" to characterize the objects of their criticism.
A veritable thesaurus of alternative labels has come into vogue
in the last two decades; the most common are "exceptions," "preferences," "special privileges," "tax expenditure," and "erosion." 39 By
implying that the tax benefits to which they are applied were purposefully enacted by Congress, these terms reject the aura of inadvertence and secrecy that emanates from the term "loophole." This,
in turn, implicitly acknowledges that repeal of these provisions will
not automatically follow their exposure to the light, the fate that
might be hypothesized for a loophole of the classical variety. Thus, a
label like "preference" or "special privilege" has the virtue of political realism, suggesting that the allowance was enacted to serve an
economic interest, that it is backed by political muscle, and that it
will not be relinquished without a legislative battle.
Tax commentators sometimes substitute these terms for "tax
loopholes" to avoid its pejorative connotation, so that the tax benefit
in question can be examined on its individual merits, without prejudgment. But this objective is rarely achieved. However impartial
the writer's intent, the new label usually starts with or quickly
acquires an aura of disapproval. "Erosion" can be a good thing, of
course-it brought fertility to the Nile Valley and beauty to the
Grand Canyon-but ordinarily it is no more welcome than an invasion of termites. As for "special privileges," they are occasionally
praised-lifetime tenure for federal judges is an example-but most
"privileges," particularly "special" ones, evoke enthusiastic denunciation. The term "tax expenditures" purports to be value-free, but
it grows out of a theory that the direct appropriations process is
presumptively a better way to confer the benefits that are embedded
in the Internal Revenue Code, and it cannot escape the pejorative
flavor that is unmistakably intended by its twin, "back-door spending."40 An "exception" to a rule sometimes implies tolerance or
benevolence, but more often it suggests an impropriety, unless justification is affirmatively proved; we like to think that laws should be
enforced without fear or favor.
What is perhaps most notable is that none of these substitutes
for the term "loophole" implies a favorable attitude. The tax pro39. See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967).
40. Heller, supra note 3, at 190 ("The back door to government subsidies marked
'tax relief' ••••"). See also Surrey, supra note 3.
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visions in question are not described as "refinements of the tax base,"
as attempts to "fine-tune" the Internal Revenue Code, or as examples
of tempering justice with mercy. The alternative labels are, in short,
euphemisms for their predecessor.
It is not surprising, therefore, that studies by experts of tax
"erosion," "preferences," and the like are regularly reported in the
press under the generic title "loopholes." By itself, this stretching of
labels would not matter. Headline writers are not expected to be
lexicographers. But when the popular conception of "tax loopholes"
-gimmicks that are invented by crafty lawyers for the very rich-is
carried over to the provisions that the expert describes as "tax expenditures" or "preferences," a monumentally false impression is
created.
A good example of this pervasive practice is a summary subtitle
in a recent article in the New York Times Magazine which portrays
"the average American taxpayer" as suffering the pains of flood and
shipwreck, while the federal government dispenses "a bountiful $77billion in 'tax welfare' each year" to "a happy few." 41 Michael
Harrington has used almost identical language to denounce the
Internal Revenue Code: "The unconscionable fact is that the Internal Revenue Code is a perverse welfare system that hands out $77
billion a year, primarily to the rich." 42 These allegations and others
like them are based on a statistical study of a wide range of tax
allowances, published by the Joint Economic Committee in 1972.
The authors are Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner, of the
Brookings Institution, whose eminence as tax economists is exploited
by the new populists to support their claim that the federal income
tax dispenses $77 billion of "tax welfare" to the rich. The carefully
detailed Pechman-Okner study, however, tells a more complex and
less lurid story. It shows that more than half of the $77 billion in tax
allowances goes to taxpayers with income from $5,000 to $25,000, and
that if these provisions were repealed, almost 5 million families with
income of less than $5,000 and about the same number with income
of $5,000 to $10,000 who now pay no income taxes would be added
to the tax rolls.43 The "happy few" who profit from "erosion" of the
41. Stern, supra note I, at 28. Although the author refers at several points to
"loopholes for the many," the central message of the article was satisfactorily summarized by the editorial captions.
42. Harrington, Ideally We Should Abolish Every Subsidy in the Internal Revenue
Code, SAT. REv., Oct. 21, 1972, at 49.
43. Pechman &: Okner, Individual Income Tax Erosion by Income Classes, in JOINT
ECONOMIC CoMMJ.'ITEE, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PRO•
GRAMS, pt. 1, at 27 (table 8) (Comm. Print 1972), reprinted in Pechman &: Okner, Individual Income Tax Erosion by Income Classes (Brookings Institution Reprint No. 230,
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tax base, it turns out, are 70.5 million families-not just Middle and
Upper America but most of Lower America as well.44
Pechman himself, unlike some who purport to build on his work,
has made this crystal clear, pointing out "that there are loopholes
for persons at all income levels" and describing the income tax as
"the best tax we have."45 Testifying before the House Committee on
Ways and Means in January of 1973, Pechman said that "a great
deal can be done-short of comprehensive reform-to improve the
progressivity of the income tax" and offered a choice of three reform
programs, which would produce revenue increases of $3.1 billion to
$10.2 billion.46 If the Pechman-Okner study demonstrated that the
federal income tax is a $77 billion welfare program for the rich, it
is hardly to be supposed that Pechman would have associated himself
-even as a last resort in a poor year for tax reform-with a program
that would leave $74 of the $77 billion unscathed.
A similar disparity between expert and popular conceptions of
tax loopholes may be found in A Populist Manifesto, which speaks of
$50 billion of tax "subsidies to the wealthy," describing them as
"outrages legislated into the tax code" that "not a senator or congressman would have the chutzpah to vote for" if they were treated as
subsidies.47 The authors then call for reforms to "close all of the
loopholes in our tax law," because otherwise "the tax-dodgers and
their advisers will simply move capital from one shelter to another." 48
But they refrain from listing the $50 billion of "subsidies to the
wealthy" that they nominate for wholesale extinction, and the unpublished study on which they rely discloses that the statutory "outrages" include substantially the same items that the Pechman-Okner
study detailed, except for the tax benefits conferred on married
couples by the joint return.49 (The fact that the major "tax welfare"
1972). Because this study uses a broader concept of income ("expanded adjusted gross
income") than existing law, many families move up the income ladder when classified
by income class in the study.
44. Id.
45. Pechman, The Rich, the Poor, and the Taxes They Pay, THE PUBLIC !NTERESI',
Fall 1969, at 21, reprinted in 115 CoNG, REc. 32361 (1969).
46. Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways o- Means,
9lld Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 149 (197ll).
47. J. NEWFIELD&: J. GREENFIELD, supra note 4, at 100.
48. Id. at 105 (emphasis original).
49. Id. at 100. The "tax expenditure" list on which they rely is substantially identical with the one published in Surrey, supra note 3, at 709-11. A later version may
be found in HOUSE COMMI1TEE ON WAYS &: MEANS, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX ExPENDITURES 4-5 (Comm. Print 1972). For criticism of the tax expenditure budget, see Bittker, supra note ll; Surrey &: Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure
Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NATL, TAX J. 528 (1969); Bittker, The Tax
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lists can be separated by about $25 billion, attributable to disagreement over the classification of one item, should suggest to the reader
that both may reflect a variety of other debatable judgments, especially since a third list, with overlapping populist sponsorship, reduces the amount of "welfare to the rich" by another $25 billion.) 150
An even more heated-but no less misleading-denunciation of tax
loopholes may be found in a discussion of white-collar crime by a
professor of sociology, who accepts an earlier author's assertion that
"honest payment by everybody liable to income tax would enable the
government to decrease the general tax burden by 40 per cent," and
then goes on to tell us that this figure "suggests rather graphically
the largely unrecognized or passed over, yet very real, cost to the
individual citizen of tax crimes." 51
This extraordinary confusion results from the fact that the tax
expert's conception of "preferences," "tax expenditures," and the
like embraces many provisions that are so familiar and widespread
that taxpayers often think of them as normal, if not essential, features
of an income tax law. Thus, the largest single component of the $77
billion of "tax welfare" that goes to the "happy few" is the rate
advantage granted to married couples who file joint returns and the
similar concessions to heads of households, to widows and widowers
with minor children, and (since 1969) to unmarried persons.152 The
only taxpayers who do not benefit from these provisions (which
account for $21.6 billion of the $77 billion of "tax welfare") 53 are
Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, 22 NATL. TAX J.
538 (1969).
50. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1973, § 4 at 18, col. 1 (advertisement for Tax Action
Campaign, described as "a project of New Populist Action"). Since the estimated $25
billion evidently embraces the corporate income tax as well as the individual income
tax, the latter's contribution to the rich must be substantially less than $25 billion.
51. F. SCHUR, OUR CRIMINAL SoCIETY 165 (1969), referring to a statistical study
described in F. GIBNEY, THE OPERATORS (1960). Professor Schur seems to think that the
"tax crimes" which prevent the tax burden from being reduced by 40 per cent are
committed primarily by business executives and large corporations, although the calculations (which Mr. Gibney advises me were given to him "by people connected with
the I.R.S., who were, however, unwilling to be quoted as their source'1 must have
been based on a tax reform program affecting tens of millions of taxpayers. (This
emerges from Mr. Gibney's own statement that the amount of tax successfully evaded
is about $5 billion, a figure that would not permit the "general tax burden" to be
reduced by anything like 40 per cent. Id. at 200.) In point of fact, both Gibney and
Schur have evidently confused a reduction in tax rates with a reduction in the tax
burden. A rate reducton made possible by expanding the tax base, which is the only
plausible basis for Gibney's figure of 40 per cent, would of course leave the aggregate
burden unchanged, so that some taxpayers would pay more and others less-the same
result that would be produced by the Pechman-Okner proposal, see text accompanying
notes 65-69 infra, to expand the base and lower the rates.
52. Pechman & Okner, supra note 43, at 33-34 (tables A-1, A-2).
53. Id. at 33 (table A-1).
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married persons filing separate returns, who constitute less than 4
per cent of the taxpaying population.54 The next largest component
in the Pechman-Okner computation, making up $14.2 billion55 of
the $77 billion total, reflects revenue to be raised by restricting the
itemized deductions for such items as state and local taxes, medical
expenses, and charitable contributions, substituting a flat $1,300 low
income allowance56 for the existing standard deduction, and repealing the extra $750 personal exemption for persons who are over 65
or blind. The third major item ($13 billion of $77 billion) 57 would
result from the taxation of transfer payments-social security, welfare, workmen's compensation, unemployment benefits, and veterans'
disability payments. Other important provisions that would be repealed or restricted by the Pechman-Okner proposals are the deductions for real property taxes and mortgage interest on personal
residences and the exclusion of interest on life insurance policies.
Although all of these tax advantages are enjoyed to some extent
by high income taxpayers, they accrue primarily to taxpayers in the
low and middle income brackets, and these are the taxpayers whose
aggregate tax liability would be most severely increased by their
repeal. 58 The only tax provisions of comparable fiscal importance
that are monopolized by high income taxpayers (i.e., those with incomes of $50,000 or more) are the capital gains rules (including the
failure to tax appreciation on gifts and bequests), accounting for
$13.7 billion of the $77 billion.69 High income taxpayers are also the
principal beneficiaries of tax-exempt interest, accelerated depreciation, and percentage depletion, but the aggregate dollar value of
these allowances ($1.7 billion) is minor when compared with the
items described above. 00
Thus, tax erosion and tax preferences are as democratic as environmental pollution: you don't have to be rich to throw a plastic
beer can under a bridge, or to exclude social security benefits from
your federal income tax return. Middle America may be fed up with
54. 1969 IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETuRNs 4 (table IC)
(2.1 million taxable returns out of 63.7 million). By classifying the 1969 rate reduction
for unmarried taxpayers as erosion, along with the joint rate applicable to married
couples, the Pechman-Okner study, Pechman & Okner, supra note 43, at 21 n.24, implies
that there was less erosion before 1969, when the ta.x distance between married and
unmarried taxpayers was greater.
55. Pechman & Okner, supra note 43, at 34 (table A-2).
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 34 (table A-2).
58. Id. at 33 (table A-1).
59. Id. at 34 (table A-2).
60. Id. at 23 (table 3).
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tax loopholes, as we are often told by social commentators who
perceive a taxpayer revolt in their crystal balls, but only a small
fraction of the $77 billion "tax welfare" program is the target of
popular outcry. Moreover, if these provisions were repealed, only
14.7 per cent of the $77 billion yield would come from families with
income over $100,000 and 9.6 per cent from those with income from
$50,000 to $100,000. 61 Another 22.5 per cent would come from ta.'l{payers with $25,000 to $50,000 of income-a group that, however
well off, can hardly be classed with the Mellons and Rockefellers but
whose present tax liability would have to be nearly doubled to raise
their share of the target. 62 This leaves more than half of the $77
billion to be collected from taxpayers with income below $25,000.
Thus, analysis of the Pechman-Okner tax erosion study is a sobering
experience. The exhilarating soak-the-rich recommendations that
have been attached to it reflect the emotive power of the term
"erosion," not the facts in the computer printouts.
To rebut this gloomy suggestion, it may be argued that aggregate
figures are misleading. Even though half of the $77 billion of new
revenue that could be raised by applying current rates to an expanded reformed tax base would come from taxpayers with $5,000
to $25,000 of income and only about 15 per cent from those with
incomes over $100,000, the per capita effect of tax reform would be
very different. The average tax increase for a family with $100,000
to $500,000 of income would be about $40,000, while the average
taxpayer at the bottom of the heap would pay only a few dollars
more than he does now. 63 The fact that comprehensive expansion of
the tax base will cost individual rich men far more than individual
poor men (so that the big loopholes are at the top), 64 however, will
not guarantee its popularity among the citizenry at large. However
small, an increased per capita burden on low and middle income
taxpayers can be painful; the last dollar may have a marginal utility
to them that equals or is greater than the marginal utility of the rich
man's last thousand dollars. In any event, if the issue is whether
comprehensive tax reform could finance massive new federal programs, the answer is "Yes, but most of the money will come from low
and middle income taxpayers."
In point of fact, though the Pechman-Okner study of erosion concluded that $77 billion of additional revenue could be raised by
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 26 (table 6).
Id.
Id. at 36 (table A-5).
Benjamin Okner, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1972, at 32, col. 4.
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applying today's tax rates to an "uneroded" tax base (aggregate taxable income of $644 billion, as against $478 billion under current
law),65 this was not its principal function. The study focussed, rather,
on the fact that a comprehensive tax base would permit tax rates to
be lowered while holding aggregate revenue constant. The statutory
changes proposed by Pechman and Okner would, of course, distribute the tax burden differently than existing law even if the total
amount to be collected is unchanged. Their program would, in
general, increase the tax burden of homeowners relative to tenants,
the burden of capital gain recipients relative to recipients of other
types of income, the burden of persons itemizing their personal
deductions relative to those using the standard deduction, and the
burden of married persons relative to unmarried persons. Other
proposals for a comprehensive tax base would have similar effects,
except that some reformers are more tolerant than Pechman and
Okner of the reduced rate granted by existing law to married couples.
These changes in horizontal equity (i.e., among persons on the
same income level) would be accompanied by equally important
changes in vertical equity (i.e., in the burdens borne by taxpayers at
one income level compared with those at other levels). Because alterations in vertical equity depend upon the rate schedule to be applied
to the expanded tax base, the possibilities are infinite, ranging from
an extremely progressive schedule to an extremely regressive one.
The Pechman-Okner study offers five alternative schedules,66 all of
which might be described as middle-of-the-road rather than extreme
proposals. One is a flat rate of 16 per cent of taxable income (as
newly defined), a proposal that would commend itself to one school
of tax reform-those who reject progression on ethical grounds or
because it complicates the tax law and who would substitute a proportional tax on all income above a specified subsistence or modest
level. This rate schedule would increase the effective tax rate on
persons with income below $25,000 and greatly reduce the effective
rate on taxpayers with more than $50,000 of expanded adjusted
gross income.67 By contrast, the most progressive of the five PechmanOkner schedules (which includes a higher initial exemption or lowincome allowance than the others) would reduce the effective rate
on taxpayers with less than $25,000 of expanded adjusted gross in65. Pechman &: Okner, supra note 43, at 24 (table 4).
66. Id. at 30-33.
67. Id. at 31 (table 11). "Expanded adjusted gross income" is adjusted gross income
as defined in section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code modified to include the income
items listed in Pechman &: Okner, supra note 43, at 23 (table 3).
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come and increase it for those above the $25,000 level.68 But these
changes would be marginal rather than revolutionary when judged
from a macroeconomic perspective. Taxpayers with expanded adjusted gross income of $50,000 or more, for example, would pay
only $2.6 billion (2.5 per cent) more of the $103 billion of income
tax than under existing law. 69

v.

SELECTIVE TAX REFORM

Comprehensive tax reform thus turns out to be only mildly redistributive if revenue is held constant, while if it is used to raise
the promised $77 billion of additional revenue by applying the exist•
ing rate schedule to the expanded tax base, only about 25 per cent
of the new money would come from families with income above
$50,000. 7°Can social reformers who have been led to believe that the
systematic elimination of tax "loopholes" is a promising way to redistribute income or a bountiful source of financing for major new
public programs salvage their objectives by abandoning the cause of
comprehensive reform and concentrating instead on a limited list of
targets? The most obvious strategy is to eliminate allowances that
favor high income taxpayers, while allowing taxpayers in more
modest circumstances to retain their tax shelters. The prime targets
would be capital gains and such items of "preference income" as
tax-exempt interest and percentage depletion. Once again, we find
that the per-family impact of tax reform may be quite substantial,
but that the aggregate result is not overwhelming. If reform is limited
to the tax shelters patronized primarily by the rich, the aggregate
amount of new revenue would be only about $13.4 billion, of which
$3.4 billion would come from taxpayers with income below $50,000.71
68. Pechman &: Okner, 'supra note 43, at 31 (table 11).
69. Id. at 26 (table 6), 38 (table A-7).
70. Id. at 26 (table 6).
71. The computation is as follows (all dollar amounts, except expanded adjusted
gross income, in millions):
Expanded Adjusted Gross Income Class
Under $50,000
Maximum tax on earned
income
Realized capital gains
Constructive realization of
capital gains
Tax-exempt interest
Accelerated depreciation
&: depletion
Totals

$50,000 &: over

Totals

112
8,041

$1,686

112
6,355

1,401
112

2,324
974

1,086

156

268

424

$3,355

$10,033

$13,388

$

$

3,725
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Who are the upper-income taxpayers who would be the principal
targets of selective tax reform (confined to capital gains, tax-exempt
interest, and percentage depletion)? The new populists imply that
the principal beneficiaries of these allowances are "tax millionaires"
with such familiar names as Ford, Rockefeller, and Mellon-the
"relative handful of Americans [who] are extravagantly endowed,
like princes in the Arabian Nights Tales," 72 described in Ferdinand
Lundberg's 1937 book, America's Sixty Families, and its 1968 sequel,
The Rich and the Super-Rich.
But just as analysis of the $77 billion of "tax welfare for the rich"
distributed by the Internal Revenue Code disclosed that most of this
amount is received by taxpayers in the middle and lower income
brackets, so an examination of selective tax reform discloses that you
don't have to be a Rockefeller to feel its impact. The reform program
just described would affect about 825 thousand families, composed
of 2 or 3 million individuals. The inhabitants of these top income
brackets make up only I or 1.5 per cent of the population, and hence
can be called a "relative handful," and they surely have more material goods than anyone at Haroun-El-Raschid's court. From a political perspective, however, it is misleading to imply that a tax reform
program affecting more than 2 million people is aimed at "America's
Sixty Families." I am in complete agreement with the objective of
increasing taxes on this segment of our population, but the attempt
to portray them as akin to Rockefellers and Fords is bound to be
counter-productive.

VI.

THE SECOND-ORDER EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM

This analysis of the "$77 billion welfare program for the rich"
becomes even more sobering when a fact of life that I have hitherto
disregarded is taken into account. All of the estimates that I have laid
before you are derived by simple arithmetic. The Pechman-Okner
study is based on a representative sample of tax returns, ingeniously
augmented by estimates of items that are not now reported, to which
the 1972 rate schedule was applied to estimate the changes in tax
liability that would result from enlarging the tax base. But when
items that are not now taxed are multiplied by today's rates, the
Figures are derived from computation done at Yale University based on the
Peckman-Okner study; a copy of the computer printout is on file with the Michigan
Law Review.
72. F.

LUNDllERG, THE RICH AND THE SUPER-RICH

l (1969).
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product is a hypothetical amount that may vary substantially from
the amount that will actually be due after the taxpayers have adjusted their :financial affairs to the new law.
This is not the place, and I am not the person, to undertake an
analysis of the second-order consequences of comprehensive tax reform. I will simply list some of the factors that would help to create
a disparity between the estimate of $77 billion of added revenue and
the amount that might actually be produced by so sweeping a
program.
First, if changes in the tax law have effects that are perceived to
be adverse to activities that are now encouraged by tax incentives,
Congress may respond by granting subsidies or other non-tax allowances as a substitute for the repealed tax incentives. Thus, some of
the "new" revenue will simply be diverted to a partial restoration of
the status quo ante. For example, repeal of the tax immunity of state
and municipal bond interest is simply not in the cards without a
substantial federal subsidy to the issuers to reimburse them for the
higher cost of borrowing. Such a subsidy would absorb a substantial
part of the new revenue, and, if it were generous enough, could cost
the Treasury more than taxing the interest would produce.78 Similarly, one can hardly contemplate taxing social security benefits,
public assistance, unemployment compensation, and some other transfer payments-as proposed by the Pechman-Okner study-without
using a large part of the "new" revenue to increase these benefits.
In other cases, the reform could hardly be enacted without offsetting
tax concessions (e.g., the repeal of income-splitting for married
couples would unquestionably require an increase in the personal
and dependency exemptions), which would absorb the "new" revenue to a significant degree. While subsidies in some instances may
be more equitable and efficient than the tax allowance they displace,74 the $77 billion for new programs may be as evanescent as the
"fiscal dividend" that was to be declared when we withdrew from
Viet Nam.
73. See Fortune, The Impact of Taxable Municipal Bonds: Policy Simulations with
a Large Econometric Model, 26 NATL. TAX J. 29 (1973). The Treasury estimated that
the cost to it of tax exemption in 1968 was $1.8 billion, of which $500 million inured
to the benefit of high-income individual investors, commercial banks, and casualty
insurance companies. A private estimate for fiscal 1971 put these amounts at $3.3
billion and $800 million, respectively. See Hearings on S. 1015 Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing c- Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 193, 277 (1972).
74. See Surrey, supra note 3.
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Second, the additional yield will be offset to some extent by
revenue reductions in later years when the new structure has reached
a "steady state." Thus, the denial of accelerated depreciation and of
the deduction for intangible drilling and development expenses in
the year of payment will increase the taxpayer's deductions in later
years (e.g., for "dry holes" and losses when the property becomes
worthless dr is sold for less than its adjusted basis). These offsets are
likely to be of more importance to high income than low income
taxpayers.
Third, some taxpayers will shift to tax avoidance tactics that are
not prohibited even by the comprehensive reform program, such as
the deferral of earned income to later years, intra-family transfers of
property, and investments in growth stocks and real property. The
reader may be inclined to reject this suggestion, believing that Congress could be induced to define "income" in such sweeping terms
as to outlaw all tax avoidance devices.76 He would do well to
remember the Duke of Wellington's response when an otherwise
forgotten person accosted him in Hyde Park with the salutation,
"Mr. Smith, I believe?" The Duke's reply: "If you believe that, you'll
believe anything."
Fourth, major changes in the tax structure are bound to have
an impact, however obscure and difficult to measure, on the taxpayer's economic choices-such as between work and leisure, between investment and consumption, between risky and safe enterprises-that will affect his pre-tax income, and therefore his tax
liability.
Fifth, these changes in each individual taxpayer's economic behavior will alter the price of goods and services for other taxpayers
who, in turn, will respond by changing their economic behavior;
these decisions will alter their pre-tax income, and hence their tax
liabilities.
VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In concluding this analysis, I should like to look once more at the
"$77 billion welfare program for the rich," this time from the perspective of the tax reform proposals offered to the electorate by Sena75. On the extent to which even the most dedicated and enthusiastic advocates of
the broad Haig-Simons definition of "income" disagree about its application in practice,
see Bittker, supra note 39.
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tor McGovern during the 1972 campaign. During the Democratic
primaries, Senator McGovern espoused a plan that, for the first time
in American history, would have brought rich and poor together into
a single comprehensive program to tax persons above a specified
break-even point and pay benefits to those below it. There were
several versions of the plan, but the one that caught the popular
imagination called for a "demogrant" of $1,000 per person as assured
income maintenance, to be paid in cash to those at the bottom of the
ladder, reduced gradually for those at low and modest income levels
by the amount of tax on their outside income, and credited against
the tax liability of those with higher incomes.76
This integration of "positive taxes" with public assistance ("negative taxes") had many adherents in academic circles, uniting economists of such diverse political convictions as Milton Friedman and
James Tobin, 77 but the idea was unknown in the outside world.
Lacking an infrastructure of public information and journalistic
support, which could not possibly be supplied in the superheated
haste of a primary campaign, the "demogrant" proposal quickly
collapsed under stress. The reasons need not be recited here, save as
they illuminate the main themes of this Article.
When first advanced by Senator McGovern, the $1,000 tax credit
proposal seemed to offer a way to redistribute income on a significant
scale by taxing only the very rich, and thus to respond to such
slogans as "take the rich off welfare." But a careful reading of Senator
McGovern's own statement would have disclosed that "about 20 per
cent of Federal taxpayers would experience a tax increase" 78-an
estimate that was later revised upward to embrace about 90 million
individuals,79 only a few of whom are named J. Paul Getty. Moreover, under the original McGovern plan a tax increase would be
experienced by a single person with income of $2,000 or more and a
married couple without children if their income was $4,000 or more.
Families with two or more children fared better under the plan,
and its supporters pointed out that a family of four would pay less
than under existing law unless its income exceeded $20,000. It was
impossible to focus solely on this idyllic and authentic American
76. McGovern, Tax Reform and Redistribution of Income, 118 CONG. R.Ec. S5626,
S5628 (daily ed. April 7, 1972), reprinted in N.Y. R.Ev. OF BooKS, May 4, 1972, at 7, 10.
77. See C. GREEN, NEGATIVE TAXES

AND THE

POVERTY PROBLEM 57-61 (1967).

78. McGovern, supra note 76, at S5628, reprinted at 10.
79. Calculations made at Yale University.
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group, however, because in the California Democratic primary Senator Humphrey quickly made himself the standard-bearer for other
American life styles. He exploited the plan's bias against unmarried
persons and childless couples, asserting that it would produce a 50
per cent increase (from $1,100 to $1,666) in the federal income tax
liability of an $8,000-per-year unmarried secretary living in San Francisco80-a homely geographical touch that could have been amended
to fit every city and hamlet in the nation. The charge, unconvincingly
denied by Senator McGovern, was devastating; it would have been
even more deadly if Senator Humphrey had had access to the computer printouts on the plan,81 showing an aggregate reduction of $100
million in taxes for families with income of $1 million or more and
scattered reductions for many other high income taxpayers, attributable to the fact that the proposed top tax rate was 48 per cent.
Though Senator McGovern won the California primary, his narrow margin in a state that had been expected to give him a smashing
victory was blamed in large part on the tax plan, which then went
back to the technicians for revision. The intolerable bias against
single persons and childless couples could be mitigated by changing
the "demogrant" from a flat amount of $1,000 per person and by distinguishing between adults and children (e.g., $1,320 for the first one
or nvo adults in a family, and $500 for each child), but this change
meant that many welfare families would be left below the poverty
line and would get less in 1975-the target date for a full employment economy-than their I 972 welfare payments, especially if the
mother was the only adult. 82 Moreover, this version of the plan was
no more financed by the rich and the super-rich than was its predecessor. Almost one half of the nation's families, comprising more
than a third of the population, would have paid more taxes than
under existing law.
Once these deficiencies, along with others that need not be
detailed here, were digested by Senator McGovern's advisers, the
"demogrant" proposal was abandoned, and an orthodox tax reform
program was substituted. It was limited to attacking such old favorites as long-term capital gains, percentage depletion, and accelerated
80. Washington Post, May 29, 1972, § A, at 12, col. 1.
81. Calculations made at Yale University.
82. Retired persons living on social security benefits and homeowners also presented
problems, for which McGovern's advisers sought to provide remedies that were not
included in the original plan.
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depreciation, and the pill was sugar-coated with a proposed reduction of the maximum tax rate from 70 to 48 per cent. The target was
$12.6 billion of added revenue from the individual income tax88well under 20 per cent of the legendary $77 billion of tax welfare
dispensed by existing law. By the time this plan was disclosed, however, the election was only two months off and, as we now know,
victory for Senator McGovern was not at hand. In accepting the
Republican nomination just a week before the revised McGovern
tax plan was unveiled, President Nixon said that the original plan
would add 82 million people to the welfare rolls. 84 He could have
offered no more ironic an obituary to the "demogrant" proposal,
which had been intended to bar the demeaning term "welfare" .by
bringing rich and poor together. The President simultaneously
demonstrated that the term "welfare" as a label for tax allowances
was a two-edged sword, tendered to him by a political opposition that
did not realize which edge was sharper. We are still hearing reverberations of this tactical reversal. John D. Ehrlichman, former assistant to the President, has asserted that comprehensive tax reform
means that "you don't let the average householder deduct the interest
on his mortgage anymore, and you don't let him deduct charitable
contributions to his church or to the Boy Scouts." 85 It is hard to deflate rhetoric of this type if one has been proclaiming that the deductions allowed by current law for local property taxes, interest on
home mortgages, and charitable contributions are integral parts of a
$77 billion welfare program for the rich and the super-rich.
Despite this painful history, I am convinced that a comprehensive
income-maintenance program, integrated with the federal income tax
system, should be high on our national agenda. But the technical
foundation for such an integrated program has only begun to be laid,
and public acceptance of its cost is even further in the future. Macroeconomic estimates, in which a hundred million dollars is the smallest unit of calculation, are easily made, but the fiasco just described
83. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at I, col. 8, at 22, cols. 4-5.
84. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1972, at 47, cols. 2-3. The estimated 82 million "on welfare"
were evidently those who would receive some cash, however small the amount. If the
President had accepted the broader theory of "tax expenditures" or "implicit grants"
espoused by some tax theorists (Pfaff, supra note 3, Heller, supra note 3, Surrey, supra
note 3), he could have said that the entire population, not merely 82 million people,
would be on the welfare rolls. See McGovern, supra note 76, at S5628, reprinted at IO.
("I propose that every man, woman and child receive from the federal government an
annual payment.")
85. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1973, at 30, col. 2.
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shows that more is required than impeccable arithmetic. We must
be clear about the effect of the program on the unmarried secretary,
the policeman who moonlights as a taxi driver, the salesman who is
married to a school teacher, the retired pharmacist living on social
security, and so on. The technician may wish to drown these cases
in a sea of averages, dismissing each inconvenient instance as idiosyncratic, but sooner or later the facts must be disclosed.
Of these facts, the most difficult to face is that the income pyramid
gets narrower as it gets higher. The rich and the super-rich at the top
make a convenient target for rhetoric, but most of the money is to
to be found at lower levels. It is a counter-productive hoax to encourage the belief that $77 billion can be raised by "taking the rich off
welfare," if the term "rich" is to have the meaning ascribed to it by
the audience to which this slogan is addressed.
In conclusion, the time has come to rescue the federal income tax
from the superheated rhetoric of its populist friends. By denouncing
it as a web of "loopholes," "organized larceny," a vast and uncontrolled program of "back-door spending," and a pork barrel of
"upside-down subsidies," they threaten to persuade wage earners
and other low and middle income taxpayers that the income tax is
the worst of all possible taxes, while leaving its competitors-state
sales taxes, local property taxes, and value-added taxation-stronger
by comparison. By indiscriminately lumping together percentage
depletion, income-splitting for married couples, the exemption of
state and municipal bond interest, the extra $750 exemption for the
blind, accelerated depreciation, the exemption of social security
payments, and so on, they imply that these features of existing law
are equally objectionable, and that a tax reform proposal is a craven
surrender to vested interests if it does not eradicate all of them
simultaneously.
This implication cannot be-faulted if it is what the populist critics
of the existing law really mean. But for those who believe, as I do
(and as I suspect the new populists, for all their rhetoric, do), that
these "loopholes" can be ranged in a hierarchy-from offensive,
through debatable and trivial, to justified-and that we would do
well to pick and choose among them, the rhetoric I have described
undermines rather than supports the cause of tax reform. If $77
billion of new revenue comes to be the popular measure of serious
tax reform, the revenue impact of any feasible program of selective
reform is bound to be disappointing, even if it concentrates on
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capital gains, tax-exempt interest, accelerated depreciation, percentage depletion, and similar high-income provisions. In my view,
therefore, the time has come for a drastic revision of the rhetoric of
tax reform.

